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Abstract
We experimentally demonstrate how unpacking provides a pos-
sible approach for mitigating the dilemma of public goods provision
through private contributions. Subjects' total contributions increase
when a single public good is split into two identical public goods, even
though marginal per capita returns of contributions are constant across
treatments. This ﬁnding not only informs NGOs about possible new
ways to increase charitable donations  in general, the unpacking eﬀect
presented here might potentially be of importance for a broad range
of mechanisms involving individually subdividable decisions.
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1 Introduction
When forming beliefs, appraising events, or evaluating categories, people of-
ten act as if the whole is less than the sum of its parts (Van Boven and
Epley 2003). Scholars of the Support Theory call this psychological artifact
the unpacking eﬀect (Rottenstreich and Tversky 1994). First studied in
relation to the formation of subjective probabilities, unpacking eﬀects have
since been found to occur in several situations, including the economic eval-
uation of bundles of private goods (Diamond and Hausman 1994, Bateman
et al. 1997).
In order to test whether the unpacking eﬀect provides a possible ap-
proach for mitigating a public goods dilemma, we conduct a laboratory ex-
periment in which a single public good is split into two identical fragments,
and subjects have to choose their contributions to each of them separately.
Comparing the results to a benchmark treatment with only a single public
good, we observe that unpacking leads to an increase in total contributions.
This suggests that contributions are super-additive in the number of identical
public goods. A possible explanation for our results is that fragmenting a
public good into two identical parts, makes cooperation a more salient strat-
egy  or, in the terminology of Support Theory, increases the support for
cooperation relatively to the alternative.1
2 Experimental Design and Predictions
In the benchmark treatment (1PG), subjects participate in 12 periods
of a typical linear public-good game in randomly rematched groups of four
players. All players receive an endowment of 60 tokens per period and simul-
taneously decide how to divide this endowment between a private account
and a collective account. Players receive 4 points for each token that they
put in their private account. Additionally, all players in the group earn 2
1Of course, one could think of several alternative mechanisms that mediate the un-
packing eﬀect. Indeed, the literature up to now is still far from being conclusive, trying to
attribute their ﬁndings to enhanced availability of information, repacking, and anchoring
(van Boven and Epley 2003)
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points for each token they or any other player puts in the collective account
 i.e., marginal per capita return (MPCR) = .5.
In the unpacking treatment (2PG)), groups are formed according to
the same procedure explained above and players again divide the 60 tokens
between their private account and two identical collective accounts, each of
which implying the same MPCR as in 1PG.
At the end of each period, players are informed about the number of
tokens their group contributed to (each of) the collective account(s) and the
payoﬀ in points from the private, from the collective account(s) and in total.
The computerized2 experiment took place at the Experimental Labora-
tory of the University of Varese Insubriae in June 2007. We ran 10 sessions
with a total of 20 matching groups (160 subjects, mainly economics students).
Subjects in ﬁve of the sessions played the benchmark treatment followed by
a surprise restart with the unpacking treatment (1PG-2PG), the order was
reversed in the other half of the sessions (2PG-1PG). The reversion helps
identify possible order eﬀects.
In all sessions, instructions were distributed at the beginning of each part
and read out aloud.3 After hearing the instructions, participants could pose
clarifying questions in private and had to answer a set of control questions to
ensure they understood the game. The accumulated points were converted
at an exchange rate of 1 Euro per 600 points (average earning 12.86 Euro).
Under classical assumptions, a contribution of zero in each period is the
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in both treatments. Alternative
assumptions, e.g., fairness or eﬃciency concerns, should aﬀect hypothesized
behavior in both treatments in the same way. Thus, any observed diﬀerence
in contributions between treatments should be due to the unpacking eﬀect.
2Fischbacher (2007)
3The treatment switch was announced only at the end of the ﬁrst twelve periods (cp. An-
dreoni 1988).
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Figure 1: Mean contributions per period
3 Results
Inexperienced Subjects
Total average contributions for the ﬁrst twelve periods in both treatments
are illustrated in Figure 1. The eﬀect of unpacking the public good is strong
and signiﬁcant from period 1 on and remains stable over time (cp. Table 1).
Overall, subjects contribute on average 43.6%more when they face two rather
than only one public good (rank sum test, p ≤ .01, 2-sided4). The panel
regression results reported in Column (1) of Table 2 are in line with the
nonparametric analysis. The coeﬃcient of 7.3 for the treatment indicator
(2PG-1PG) is signiﬁcantly positive.
Our data thus suggests that voluntary contributions increase when the
good is split into fragments.5 However, the observed eﬀect cannot sustain
cooperation over the course of time. Consistent with the phenomenon of con-
ditional cooperation documented in other linear public-goods experiments
(e.g. Fischbacher et al. 2001), we observe a positive and signiﬁcant relation
4With the exception of the ﬁrst period (where individual contributions are indepen-
dent), all reported statistical tests are based on matching group averages.
5This is not caused by the existence of an additional public good per se, but rather
by the fact that subjects in 2PG tend to contribute to both public goods (overall average
contributions in 2PG to the two unpacked public goods are 13.53 and 8.91).
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between contributions and the number of tokens allocated to the collective
account by the other group members in the previous period (cp. the coeﬃ-
cient of Contribution of others (t-1) in column 1 of Table 2). The interaction
term in column 3 of Table 2 suggests that conditional cooperation in periods
1 to 12 tends to be weaker in the 2PG case. This eﬀect is however only
marginally signiﬁcant (p=0.089).
Experienced Subjects
After period twelve, a restart was announced and treatments were switched.
Figure 1 and Table 3 describe subjects' behavior for the periods 13 to 24,
as well as the average increase in contributions between period 12 and 13
(restart eﬀect).
When evaluating the eﬀects of unpacking the public good on experi-
enced subjects, we have to take into account the fact that contributions in
period 12 of 2PG-1PG are signiﬁcantly higher than those of 1PG-2PG due
to the unpacking eﬀect. Therefore, a direct comparison of the average contri-
butions in the second phase of the experiment is diﬃcult to interpret  and
without a correction for the diﬀerences in the game history in the ﬁrst phase
of the experiment, one might be tempted to conclude that the unpacking
eﬀect does not aﬀect subjects' behavior in the second half (cp. Figure 1 and
Table 3).
However, even experienced subjects are susceptible to the unpacking ef-
fect. First, consider the strong asymmetry in the strength of the restart
eﬀect as reported in Table 3. Between periods 12 and 13, the average jump
in contributions when moving from 2PG to 1PG is only 27.4% (or 5.5 units),
whereas it is 115.2% (or 12.1 units) when moving from 1PG to 2PG, the
diﬀerence being signiﬁcant (rank sum test, p = .016, 2-sided). Second, the
panel regression results for the second half of the experiment as reported in
Column (2) of Table 2 show that, when controlling for the individual contri-
butions in period 12, the coeﬃcient for the treatment indicator (2PG-1PG)
is again signiﬁcant (−3.977). We thus conclude that the unpacking of the
public good not only stimulates contributions from inexperienced subjects
but also induces experienced subjects to contribute more. In contrast to pe-
riods 1 to 12 we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant interaction between the treatment dummy
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and the lagged contributions from other group members.
4 Concluding Remarks
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to show that splitting a single
public good into distinct but identical parts strongly and signiﬁcantly in-
creases subjects' voluntary contributions. This unpacking eﬀect even persists
when subjects are experienced (in the sense that they already participated
in a regular public good game).
In comparison to existing possible solutions of the public goods dilemma
(e.g., funding public goods with lotteries, Morgan and Sefton 2000; intro-
ducing costly opportunities to punish free-riders, Fehr and Gächter 2000,
Nikiforakis and Normann 2008), our concept does not suﬃce to sustain co-
operation in the long run. However, it is characterized by its appealing
simplicity and practicability, and it is able to increase contributions in the
short run. In this regard, unpacking appears to be a good means in situations
involving one-shot interactions.
In contrast to the existing research on the unpacking eﬀect, we show that
unpacking aﬀects behavior in an incentivized environment. Along the same
line, the present article also informs the literature on contingent valuation
methods. Existing studies already demonstrate serious ﬂaws from evaluating
a project or assigning economic values to natural resources by asking citizens
about their hypothetical willingness to pay (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1999). In
view of the present paper, the resulting estimations might be biased alone
by asking citizens to state dollar valuations for more than one sub-project
at the same time. More generally, the unpacking eﬀect might potentially
be of importance for a broad range of mechanisms involving individually
subdividable decisions.
Outside the lab, splitting a public good will frequently coincide with
providing more detailed information about the usage of the voluntary con-
tributions  which in itself might increase voluntary contributions, because
individuals tend to donate more when they are able to identify recipients
(cp. Small and Loewenstein 2003). While NGOs currently try to make use
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of this identiﬁable victim eﬀect by providing information about the speciﬁc
projects they support, in light of our results NGOs might do even better if
they additionally asked donors to decide simultaneously on a contribution
to each (or a subset) of these distinct projects, instead of asking for a sin-
gle contribution to the program in general. Yet, the test of this interesting
implication is for a separate empirical ﬁeld study.
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Table 1: Mean contributions to the public good(s) before the restart
Period(s)
1 1-4 5-8 9-12 12 1-12
2PG-1PG 36.3 33.8 29.6 21.4 20.1 28.3
1PG-2PG 28.5 25.5 18.7 14.9 10.5 19.7
Diﬀerence 7.8 8.3 10.9 6.5 9.6 8.6
Prob > |z| 0.003 0.016 0.010 0.096 0.034 0.010
Obs. 160 20 20 20 20 20
Notes: The fourth row reports p-values from a nonparametric (two-sided) Wilcoxon rank
sum test. With the exception of the ﬁrst period (where individual contributions are
independent), statistical tests are based on matching group averages.
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Table 2: Regression results: Linear two-way random eﬀects model
Contributions (1) (2) (3) (4)
in Periods: 1 - 12 13 -24 1 - 12 13 -24
2PG-1PG 7.317** -3.977* 9.517*** -5.182**
(3.055) (2.405) (3.273) (2.600)
Contribution of others(t-1) 0.027*** 0.017** 0.050*** 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011)
Period -1.298*** -1.020*** -1.272*** -1.005***
(0.105) (0.076) (0.106) (0.076)
Contribution(t=12) 0.452*** 0.452***
(0.048) (0.048)
Contribution of others(t-1)*2PG-1PG -0.030* 0.022
(0.018) (0.017)
Constant 26.310*** 29.790*** 24.714*** 30.048***
(2.374) (2.348) (2.520) (2.372)
Obs. 1760 1920 1760 1920
Wald χ2 227 303 231 305
Prob> χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: This Table reports coeﬃcient estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from a two-
way linear Random Eﬀects model - accounting for both potential individual dependency
over time and dependency within each matching group. The dependent variable is the total
contribution to the public good(s) in each period. Contribution of others (t-1) stands for
the sum of the other group members' contributions to the public good(s) in the previous
period. Period captures the time trend by indicating periods 1 to 12 and 13 to 24.
Contribution (t=12) indicates individual contributions in period 12. Treatment 1PG-2PG
serves as the reference category (i.e. in periods 1 to 12, the reference category is 1PG,
whereas in in periods 13 to 24, the reference category is 2PG). Signiﬁcance level is denoted
as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.01 and *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Mean contributions to the public good(s) after the restart
Period(s) Restart Eﬀect
13 24 13-24 Period 1312
2PG-1PG 25.6 9.8 17.0 +27.4% (+5.5)
1PG-2PG 22.7 9.2 16.6 +115.2% (+12.1)
Prob > |z| 0.450 0.545 0.940 0.016
Obs. 20 20 20 20
Notes: The third row reports p-values from a nonparametric (two-sided) Wilcoxon rank
sum test. Statistical tests are based on matching group averages.
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